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1 Introduction
It is known that the multisector Cournot-Nash models may exhibit mul-
tiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. That is, a coordination failure may exist
(e.g., Bryant 1983; Cooper and John 1988). Among others, the condition
is that the price elasticity of demand is sufficiently low at the survival level
of consumption (Heller 1986). This paper investigates the macroeconomic
implications of the Heller model by analyzing the intra-industrial interaction
and the circulative structure of multisector economy.
There are two main trends of macroeconomic theory based on microfoun-
dation. One is the New Classical (e.g., Lucas 1972, later the RBC literature).
According to Hahn and Solow (1995),
It proposes that the actual economy can be read as if it is
acting out or approximating the infinite-time discounted utility
maximizing program of a single, immortal representative agent.
. . . There is simply no possibility of coordination failure. . ..
Another trend is the New Keynesian. Although there are several types
of models, the common factor is that they construct the models that deviate
from the Walrasian mechanism. According to Mankiw and Romer (1991).
There are two questions that one may ask about any theory
of economic fluctuations.
$\bullet$ Does the theory violate the classical dichotomy?. . .
$\bullet$ Does the theory assume that real market imperfections in
the economy are crucial for understanding economic fluctu-
ations?. . .
New Keynesian economics answers an emphatic yes to both of
these questions.
In this paper, we $\mathrm{w}o$uld answer “no” for the first question, and “yes” for the
second one. As in Heller (1986), the money doesn’t appear in the model.
The real market imperfection that we consider is the imperfect competition.
203
Following Ch.4 in Cooper (1999), there are two types of imperfect competi-
tions on which macroeconomic models based. One is well-known the model
of monopolistic competition represented by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
Another type of the model is the multisector Cournot-Nash models rep-
resented by Hart (1982), Heller (1986)i. The economy consists of multiple
sectors. In each sector, firms behave strategically as an oligopolist taking
as given the position of the industry demand curve, determined by the level
of activity in other sectors, and the output level of other firms in their own
sector. Cooper (1999) says that there is usually strategic substitutability
across sellers, and the economy exhibits a form of strategic complementarity
across sectors. However, the model we will present here, originated by Heller
(1986), has completely different characteristics from Cooper and the other
oligopoly theorists in mind.
The purpose of this paper, hence, is to present the rich implications of
the intra- and inter-industrial interactions, and to analyze it as an AD-AS
approach. It is found that there is a strategic complementarity across firms
within each industry, and that there exhibits both forms of strategic comple-
mentarity and strategic substitutability across sectors. It is shown that the
curve of subjective aggregate supply is downward sloping in addition to that
of the objective demand2. The subjective aggregate supply curve is derived
by the loci of the partial Cournot-Nash equilibria.
In section 2, we present the Heller model and analyze the intra- and
inter-industrial relations. In section 3, we analyst the objective demand and
subjective supply curve like AD-AS approach. In section 4, we conclude it.
1We would like to notice that the seminal model of this type can be found in Nikaido
(1975), since it is not mentioned in Cooper (1999).
2Nikaido (1975) analyses the model of Leontief system of two goods and two sectors.
It is said that the objective demand curves need not be downward sloping. Our model
is a partial in the sense of Hart (1982). That is, we restrict the type of utility function
through the analysis.
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2 The Heller Model
In this section, we would construct the modified version of Heller model.
Consider the structure of modern economy. The economy consists of multiple
sectors. Consumers spent their income to their favorite goods. It commonly
happen that those goods are not coincide with the goods of industry they
work for. Suppose that the worker doesn’t directly consume their working
industry’s products. Another character of modern economy is that the tech-
nological progress is highly developed. Because of that, the workers need
different skills for new jobs at different industry. Thus, we assume that the
labors don’t change the industry. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict the
number of sectors as two. There are $n$ households and $m$ firms in each sector.
In each sector, firms produce the homogeneous final consumption goods.
2.1 Consumer
Suppose that consumer preferences are defined by Stone-Geary type with $n$
goods, that is,
$u(x_{1}, x_{2}, \ldots, x_{n})=\Pi_{i=1}^{n}(x_{i}-\underline{x}_{i})^{\beta:}$ , $\beta_{i}>0$ . (1)
This is also called linear expenditure system (LES), since the derived demand
functions become linear with respect to real income. Assume that $n=2$ ,
and that one is consumption good $c$ , another is leisure $l$ . Taking logarithms
we get
$u(c, l)=\beta_{1}\log(c-\underline{c})+\beta_{2}\log l$ . (2)
Notice that we assume $\underline{l}=0$ .
Suppose that type 1 representative consumer solves the following problem.
$\max_{c_{2^{\downarrow 1}}}$,
$\beta_{1}\log(c_{2}-\underline{c})+\beta_{2}\log l_{1}$ , (3)
$s.t$ . $p_{2}c_{2}\leq w_{1}L_{1}^{s}+r_{1}$ ,
$l_{1}=\overline{L}-L_{1}^{s}$ ,
where $c_{2},$ $l_{1}$ are consumption of sector 2 and leisure of type 1 respectively.
The profits of good 1 firms are equally distributed to the type 1 households.
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It is denoted by $r_{1} \equiv\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{m}\pi_{1}^{i}$ . There is the survival level of consumption
$\underline{c}(>0).\overline{L}$ and $L_{1}^{s}$ denote the initial endowment of labor and the labor supply
of type 1 household respectively.
Similarly, the problem of type 2 households has the symmetric structure.
That is,
$\max$ $\beta_{1}\log(c_{1}-\underline{\mathrm{c}})+\beta_{2}\log l_{2}$ , (4)
$c_{1},1_{2}$
$s.t$ . $p_{1}c_{1}\leq w_{2}L_{2}^{s}+r_{2}$ ,
$l_{2}=\overline{L}-L_{2}^{s}$ .
Notice that $\beta_{1}$ and $\beta_{2}$ are common across types. For the sake of brevity, we
consider the problem of type 1.
The first order condition is
$\frac{\beta_{1}l_{1}}{\beta_{2}(c_{2}-\underline{c})}=\frac{p_{2}}{w_{1}}$ . (5)
The demand function of type 1 becomes
$c_{2}(p_{2}, w_{1}, r_{1})= \frac{\beta_{2}\underline{c}}{\beta}+\frac{\beta_{1}(w_{1}\overline{L}+r_{1})}{\beta p_{2}}$, (6)
where $\beta=\beta_{1}+\beta_{2}$ .
For simplicity, suppose that $n=1$ . Then, the inverse demand function
of market 2 can be written as
$p_{2}( \mathrm{c}_{2}, w_{1}, r_{1})=\frac{\beta_{1}(w_{1}\overline{L}+r_{1})}{\beta c_{2}-\beta_{2}\underline{c}}$. (7)
The inverse of price elasticity of demand becomes
$\frac{Ep_{2}(c_{2},w_{1},r_{1})}{Ec_{2}}=\frac{\beta c_{2}}{\beta c_{2}-\beta_{2}\underline{\mathrm{c}}}$. (8)
Similarly, the above equations for type 2 can be derived by changing the
number.
2.2 Firm
There are $m$ firms within a sector. For simplicity, suppose that the pro-
duction function is identical in each sector and $m=2$ . Then, for sector $j$
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$(j=1,2)$ , the production function is given by
$y_{j}=\alpha L_{j}^{d}$ , $\alpha>0$ . (9)
Consider the firm $i$ of sector 1 $(i=1,2)$ . She maximizes her profits taking
as given the subjective inverse demand function (7) and the outputs of the
other firms within the sector. Then, the profit function becomes
$\pi_{1}(y_{1}^{i}, \mathrm{Y}_{1}’, w_{2}, r_{2})=[p_{1}(y_{1}^{i}, \mathrm{Y}_{1}’, w_{2}, r_{2})-\frac{w_{1}}{\alpha}]y_{1}^{i}$ for $i=1,2$ . (10)
The first order condition of firm $i$ of sector 1 is
$p_{1}(1- \frac{y_{1}^{i}}{\mathrm{Y}_{1}}\cdot\frac{Ep_{1}}{Ec_{1}})=\frac{w_{1}}{\alpha}$ for $i=1,2$ . (11)
From (11), we can derive the response functions for firm 1, 2, in sector
1 whose shapes appear in Figure 1. From the above discussions, we can
establish the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. There are two partial symmetric Cournot-Nash equi-
libria in each industry. They exhibit strategic complement at each equilibrium.
proof. Combining (11), (7) and (8), it can be written as
$\frac{\beta_{1}(w_{2}\overline{L}+r_{2})}{\beta \mathrm{Y}_{1}-\beta_{2}\underline{c}}(1-\frac{\beta y_{1}^{1}}{\beta Y_{1}-\beta_{2}\underline{c}})=\frac{w_{1}}{\alpha}$. (12)
Taking the implicit derivative of (12) with respect to $y_{1}^{1}$ and $y_{1}^{2}$ , we obtain
$\frac{dy_{1}^{1}}{dy_{1}^{2}}=\frac{\beta(Y_{1}-2y_{1}^{1})-\beta_{2}\underline{c}}{-2(\beta(Y_{1}-y_{1}^{1})-\beta_{2}\underline{c})}$. (13)
Substituting $y_{1}^{1}=y_{1}^{2}=y_{1}^{*}$ into (13),
$\frac{dy_{1}^{1}}{dy_{1}^{2}}=\frac{\beta_{2}\underline{c}}{2(\beta y^{*}-\beta_{2}\underline{c})}>0$ . (14)
This implies that there exhibits a strategic complement at the equilibria. The
proof of existence of two C-N equilibria is shown in the proof of Proposition 4.
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$0$ $\underline{y}_{1}^{-}$ $\overline{y}_{1}^{*}$
Figure 1: Reaction Function of Intra-Industry
2.3 Feasibility Condition
Consider the feasibility conditions. Since it is symmetric in intra-industry,
the equilibrium output of each firm would be equal. That is $y_{1}^{1}=y_{1}^{2}=$
. . . $=y_{1}^{*}$ . Because of identical utility function, demands for consumption of
consumers in each type are equal. Hence, the feasibility condition for good
1 market is $nc_{1}=my_{1}$ .
On the other hand, the feasibility condition for type 1labor market can
be written as $nL_{1}^{s}=mL_{1}^{d}$ .
$l^{\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}$ the production function and the time constraint of Labor supply,
$L_{1}^{s}=\overline{L}-l_{1}$ , the feasibility condition can be derived as
$l_{1}= \overline{L}-\frac{c_{1}}{\alpha}$ . (15)
2.4 General Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
Consider the symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) in each sector. Suppose
that $w=w_{1}=w_{2}=1$ . From consumer’s f.o.c. (5),
$p_{2}(c_{2}, l_{1})= \frac{\beta_{1}l_{1}}{\beta_{2}(c_{2}-\underline{c})}$ (16)
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Substituting the feasibility condition (15) into (16)
$p_{2}(c_{2}, c_{1})= \frac{\beta_{1}(\overline{L}-^{c}\alpha\lrcorner)}{\beta_{2}(c_{2}-\underline{c})}$ . (17)
Since we focus on the symmetric Nash equilibria (SNE) in each sector,
the equilibrium output is equal; $y_{1}^{i}=y_{1}=\mathrm{Y}_{1}/m$ and $y_{2}^{i}=y_{2}=\mathrm{Y}_{2}/m$ . Rom
(11) and $w_{2}=1$ , firm’s f.o.c. in good 2 industry can be written as:
$\frac{Ep_{2}}{Ec_{2}}=m[1-\frac{1}{p_{2}\alpha}]$ . (18)
Substituting (17) into RHS in (18), we obtain,
$\frac{Ep_{2}}{Ec_{2}}=m[1-\frac{\beta_{2}(c_{2}\underline{c})}{\beta_{1}(\alpha\overline{L}c_{1})}=]$ . (19)
Substituting (8) into LHS in (19),
$\frac{\beta c_{2}}{\beta c_{2}-\beta_{2}\underline{c}}=m[1-\frac{\beta_{2}(c_{2}\underline{c})}{\beta_{1}(\alpha\overline{L}c_{1})}=]$ . (20)
Similarly, since the structure of industry is symmetric, the correspond-




Figure 2: General Cournot-Nash Equilibria
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PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that the following three conditions (21), (22)
and (23) are satisfied, then there are four general Cournot-Nash equilibria
(GCNE) in this economy. Two of those are symmetric, the other two are
asymmetric. The symmetric GCNE are Pareto-ranked.
proof. From Theorem 4 in Heller (1986), The set of corresponding con-
ditions for the symmetric multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria is that there is




For asymmetric GCNE. Solving the equation (20) for $c_{1}$ . Then, we obtain
the functionj $c_{1}=\phi_{1}(c_{2})$ . $I\dagger,om$ Figure 2, if the above two conditions are
satisfied, then there are two intersection on the 45 degree line. Let $c^{h}$ be




In this section, we consider the macroeconomic implication of multisector
Cournot-Nash (C-N) model.
3.1 Objective Demand Curve
From the utility maximization problem (4), the labor supply function is de-
rived to
$L_{1}^{s}(w_{1},p_{2}, r_{1})= \frac{\beta_{1}\overline{L}}{\beta}+\frac{\beta_{2}(p_{2}\underline{c}-r_{1})}{\beta w_{1}}$ . (24)
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Suppose that an aggregate labor supply is full-employed by the firms.
Notice that we don’t consider Prm’s profit maximization for a moment. Then,
the share distribution of each type 1 consumer becomes the following:
$r_{1}= \frac{m}{n}\pi=\frac{m}{n}(p_{1}y_{1}-w_{1}L_{1}^{d})$ ,
$= \frac{m}{n}(\alpha p_{1}-w_{1})L_{1}^{d}$ , $(y_{1}=\alpha L_{1}^{d})$ (25)
$=(\alpha p_{1}-w_{1})L_{1}^{s}(w_{1},p_{2}, r_{1})$ . $(L_{1}^{d}= \frac{n}{m}L_{1}^{s}(w_{1},p_{2}, r_{1}))$
Substituting (25) into (24) and solving for $L_{1}^{s}$ , we obtain,
$L_{1}^{s}(w_{1},p_{2},p_{1})= \frac{\beta_{1}w_{1}\overline{L}+\beta_{2}p_{2^{\underline{C}}}}{\beta_{1}w_{1}+\beta_{2}\alpha p_{1}}$ . (26)
We can call it as the objective labor supply function of type 1 consumer.
Using (26), the share distribution can be written as
$r_{1}=( \alpha p_{1}-w_{1})\frac{\beta_{1}w_{1}\overline{L}+\beta_{2}p_{2^{\underline{C}}}}{\beta_{1}w_{1}+\beta_{2}\alpha p_{1}}$ . (27)
Substituting (27) into the demand function (6), and aggregate the demand
for good 2,
$C_{2}(p_{2},p_{1}, w_{1})=n( \frac{\beta_{2}\underline{c}}{\beta}+\frac{\beta_{1}w_{1}\overline{L}}{\beta p_{2}}+\frac{\beta_{1}(\alpha p_{1}-w_{1})(\beta_{1}w_{1}\overline{L}+\beta_{2}p_{2}\underline{c})}{\beta p_{2}(\beta_{1}w_{1}+\beta_{2}\alpha p_{1})})$. (28)
Since we focus on the symmetric equilibria and the aggregate demand func-
tion is homothetic of degree $0$ , let $p_{1}=p_{2}=p$ and $w_{1}=w_{2}=1$ ,
$C(p)=n( \frac{\beta_{2}\underline{c}}{\beta}+\frac{\beta_{1}\overline{L}}{\beta p}+\frac{\beta_{1}(\alpha p-1)(\beta_{1}\overline{L}+\beta_{2}p\underline{c})}{\beta p(\beta_{1}+\beta_{2}\alpha p)})$ . (29)
This is the objective demand function.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that $\alpha\overline{L}>\underline{c}$, then the objective demand curve
is downward sloping.
proof. The proof is straight forward. Taking derivative of (29) with respect
to $p$ ,
$\frac{dC(p)}{dp}=-\frac{n\alpha\beta_{1}\beta_{2}(\alpha\overline{L}-\underline{c})}{(\beta_{1}+\beta_{2}\alpha p)^{2}}$ (30)
Hence if $\alpha\overline{L}>\underline{c}$, then
$\frac{dC(p)}{dp}<0$ . (31)
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The assumption $\alpha\overline{L}>\underline{c}$ is quite plausible because it implies that outputs
produced by all initial endowments exceed the survival level of consumption.
3.2 Subjective C-N Curve
We suppose that firms don’t know the objective demand curve. Hence firms
face subjective demand. Thus, from (7), the inverse demand function can be
written as
$p_{2}(Y_{2}, I_{1})= \frac{\beta_{1}nI_{1}}{\beta Y_{2}-\beta_{2}n\underline{c}}$, (32)
where $I_{I}\equiv w_{1}\overline{L}+r_{1}$ , and $\mathrm{Y}_{2}$ denotes the total output of industry 2.
$\frac{Ep(\mathrm{Y}_{2},I_{1})}{EY_{2}}=\frac{\beta \mathrm{Y}_{2}}{\beta Y_{2}-\beta_{2}n\underline{c}}$ . (33)
From (11), (7), and (33), the f.o.c. of the representative firm 2 becomes
$\frac{n\beta_{1}I_{1}}{\beta \mathrm{Y}_{2}-\beta_{2}n\underline{c}}(1-\frac{y_{2}^{i}}{\mathrm{Y}_{2}}\cdot\frac{\beta \mathrm{Y}_{2}}{\beta \mathrm{Y}_{2}-\beta_{2}n\underline{c}})=\frac{w_{2}}{\alpha}$ . (34)
Solving (34) for $y_{2}^{i}$ taking as given $\mathrm{Y}_{2}$ , and setting $w_{1}=w_{2}=1,$ $n=1$ for
simplicity, we obtain
$y_{2}^{i}=(1- \frac{(\beta \mathrm{Y}_{2}-\beta_{2}\underline{c})}{\alpha\beta_{1}I_{1}})\frac{\beta \mathrm{Y}_{2}-\beta_{2}\underline{c}}{\beta}$. (35)
Aggregating (35) through the sector, and solving for $Y_{2}$ , then we can obtain
the following function
$Y_{2}(I_{1})= \frac{\beta_{2}\underline{c}}{\beta}+\frac{(m-1)\alpha\beta_{1}I_{1}\pm\sqrt{((m-1)\alpha\beta_{1}I_{1})^{2}-4m\beta_{2}\underline{c}(\alpha\beta_{1}I_{1})}}{2m\beta}$ . (36)
PROPOSITION 4. Subjective C-N curve is downward sloping.
proof. Let $D=((m-1)\alpha\beta_{1}I_{1})^{2}-4m\beta_{2}\underline{c}(\alpha\beta_{1}I_{1})$ . If $D\geq 0$ , that is,
$I_{1} \geq\frac{4m\beta_{2}\underline{c}}{(m-1)^{2}\beta_{1}\alpha}\equiv\underline{I}$ , (37)
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$p_{1}$
$0$ $\underline{Y}\mathrm{i}$ $Y_{1}^{*}$ $Y_{1}$
Figure 3: AD-AS Analysis
then there exists solution for $Y_{2}$ . Moreover, if $D>0$ , then there are two
solutions. Denote $Y_{2}^{h}(I_{1})$ and $Y_{2}^{l}(I_{1})$ as higher outputs and lower outputs,
respectively. From (36), for all $I_{1}>\underline{I}$,
$\frac{d\mathrm{Y}_{2}^{h}(I_{1})}{dI_{1}}>0$ , $\frac{d\mathrm{Y}_{2}^{l}(I_{1})}{dI_{1}}<0$ . (38)
$hom$ the subjective demand function (32), we can obtain the corresponding
price levels to $Y_{2}(I_{1})$ .
$p_{2}(I_{1})= \frac{\beta_{1}I_{1}}{\beta \mathrm{Y}_{2}(I_{1})-\beta_{2}\underline{c}}$ . (39)
Then, the sets ofprices and outputs $(p_{2}(I_{1}), Y_{2}(I_{1}))$ creates the subjective C-N
curve appears in $Fi_{\mathit{9}}ure\mathit{3}$.
4 Conclusion
We have shown the fruitful results of the multiple Cournot-Nash model. We
would like to note that the assumptions are not so much different from Wal-
rasian. The differences are the multisector structure and the imperfect com-
petition at the goods markets. These assumptions seem to suit the developed
countries well. In developed countries, there are lots of industries and the
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relationships of those industries are more intricate. It seems odd to sup-
pose that there is a powerful auctioneer who can adjust the entire markets
simultaneously. If there is not such an auctioneer in the economy, and the
prices are determined by market by market, then the state of economy could
easily fluctuate among these equilibria. Furthermore, there is the possibility
that the economy would not reach any equilibria and fluctuates forever. We
can say that this is another type of coordination failure. In order to avoid
these situations, some authorities, such as the government and central bank,
should announce the direction of that they are proceeding to. Another effec-
tive policy is to make the market more competitive by the means of allowing
the new entry to the industry. This latter policy is aimed to change the
structure of the economy itself.
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